Caught Between Ideals and Reality
Many economists do not have a particularly deep understanding of the true nature of the free-market system or of the prerequisites necessary for its strengths and benefits to be fully realized.
Author: GUDORDI | 2024-12-07
很多我們在自由巿場經濟體系中視為理所當然，並認為是人性使然的，其實都不是真的沿自人的自然本性，而是人的文化。因此，只是廢除了一個經濟裏面的中央計劃職能，並不會如某些人想像的那樣，可以戲劇性地令到一個由企業創新推動的自由巿場經濟體系能即時建立起來。支撐着自由巿場經濟體系的，其實是有着大量經歷了很多代的演化和發展才孕育出來的資本主義文化和基礎，這包括法律、慣例、行為和很多各種不同的商業上的專業和操守，但以上這些，在中央計劃的經濟體系中，皆是沒有任何存在空間的。
由中央計劃主導的經濟體系，例如前蘇聯的體制，在創造財富和提高生活水平方面，會遇到很多的困難。在理論上–在實際執行上很多時也往往如是，其生產和分配皆是由中央政府向各個不同生產機構發出的具體指令決定的，而且往往是以國家命令的形式推行…..
“Much of what we took for granted in our free market system and assumed to be human nature was not nature at all, but culture. The dismantling of the central planning function in an economy does not , as some had supposed, dramatically establish a free market entrepreneurial system. There is a vast amount of capitalist culture and infrastructure underpinning market economies that has evolved over generations: laws, conventions, behaviours, and a variety of business professions and practices that have no important function in a centrally planned economy.…”
──Alan Greenspan
According to estimates, humans have existed on Earth for roughly several hundred thousand years. Yet the day when human civilization came closest to destruction was probably during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. At that time, many senior figures on both the American and Soviet sides believed that the other side had already decided to go to war, and they were therefore prepared to launch nuclear weapons first at any moment.
A nuclear war was ultimately avoided thanks to a series of fortunate coincidences. These included President Kennedy’s conclusion that Khrushchev had not ordered the killing of American military personnel, as well as the fact that Kennedy’s brother eventually found someone at the Soviet Embassy in the United States who could ensure that messages were delivered directly to Khrushchev. These and other factors enabled both sides to slam on the brakes at almost the very last second and negotiate a compromise exit strategy that was acceptable to both parties.
The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Shift in the Pendulum
According to estimates, humans have existed on Earth for hundreds of thousands of years. The day on which human civilization came closest to destruction was arguably the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. At the time, many senior figures in both the United States and the Soviet Union believed that the other side had already decided to go to war, leading both camps to prepare for the possible launch of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear war was ultimately avoided due to several fortunate coincidences. These included President John F. Kennedy’s belief that Nikita Khrushchev had not ordered the killing of American military personnel, as well as efforts by Kennedy’s brother to find someone within the Soviet diplomatic mission who could reliably relay messages to Khrushchev. These developments enabled both sides to pull back at almost the last possible moment and negotiate a withdrawal plan that was acceptable to both parties.
The Danger of the Cuban Missile Crisis Helped Shift the Direction
The crisis may also have fostered a degree of mutual trust between Kennedy and Khrushchev. More importantly, it likely made both leaders realize that if the prevailing trajectory of Cold War confrontation continued, the ultimate consequence could be the destruction of human civilization itself.
From this perspective, Kennedy’s 1963 Peace Strategy speech can be understood as his first attempt to reverse that trajectory. It achieved some success, but unfortunately this “deal of the century” was cut short by Kennedy’s assassination.
Even so, the momentum for change may have persisted. More than twenty years later, Mikhail Gorbachev’s series of conciliatory initiatives toward the West, his vision of a new world order, and his response to the political transformations in Eastern Europe can all be seen as a continuation—or second wave—of Kennedy’s earlier initiative.
The Second Wave of the "Deal of the Century"
In some respects, this second wave may have been even more ambitious and idealistic than the first. At the time, the United States and the Soviet Union were universally recognized as the world’s two superpowers. Had they jointly led efforts to end the arms race and reduce nuclear arsenals, the global threat posed by nuclear weapons could have been significantly diminished.
More importantly, in terms of building a new international order, if the United States and the Soviet Union had been able to cooperate—or even develop a shared voice guided by humanity’s long-term interests and principles of international justice—the ability of the United Nations Security Council to address geopolitical conflicts around the world would have been greatly strengthened.
Undoubtedly, this vision was highly idealistic. However, it also had practical foundations. The Soviet economy could no longer sustain the enormous costs of the arms race, particularly after the Reagan administration escalated military competition through initiatives such as the Strategic Defense Initiative.
From the Soviet perspective, rather than continuing a costly and ultimately unproductive rivalry, it made more sense to help create a more peaceful international order, gradually integrate the Soviet Union into the global system, develop civilian economies, and allow both sides to pursue political reform within a stable and peaceful environment.
According to various accounts, during Gorbachev’s handling of the political changes in Eastern Europe, there was an understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union that NATO would not expand further eastward. From this viewpoint, NATO’s subsequent eastward expansion became an important part of the historical background that eventually contributed to the current war in Ukraine.
An Even Greater Missed Opportunity: The Economic Dimension
Viewed in this light, the late 1980s and early 1990s presented a genuine opportunity for a breakthrough in the cause of world peace. Unlike the situation in 1963, this time the initiative came from the Soviet Union, and arguably reflected even greater idealism and ambition than Kennedy’s earlier efforts.
Unfortunately, Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963, while Gorbachev left office in 1991. Since 1990, U.S. foreign policy appears to have increasingly reflected the logic of traditional European-style realpolitik rather than the more idealistic outlook that characterized certain aspects of American policy during the First and Second World Wars.
One cannot help but wonder whether this opportunity might have been far more likely to succeed had a leader like Kennedy been in office at the time.
In the long run, however, the author believes that the greater missed opportunity may have been economic rather than geopolitical.
As suggested by the quotation from Alan Greenspan cited at the beginning of the article, many economists have only a limited understanding of the true nature of the free-market system and of the conditions required for its strengths to be fully realized. The political transformations in Eastern Europe therefore provided a rare and valuable opportunity to explore and experiment with different approaches to building market institutions.
Regrettably, that opportunity also appears not to have been fully utilized.