Navigating Between Ideals and Reality
Many economists have a limited understanding of the true nature of the free market system and the conditions necessary for its full potential to be realized.
Author: GUDORDI | 2024-12-07
The changes in Eastern Europe provide a good and rare opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of economic and peace issues. (Shutterstock)
很多我們在自由巿場經濟體系中視為理所當然，並認為是人性使然的，其實都不是真的沿自人的自然本性，而是人的文化。因此，只是廢除了一個經濟裏面的中央計劃職能，並不會如某些人想像的那樣，可以戲劇性地令到一個由企業創新推動的自由巿場經濟體系能即時建立起來。支撐着自由巿場經濟體系的，其實是有着大量經歷了很多代的演化和發展才孕育出來的資本主義文化和基礎，這包括法律、慣例、行為和很多各種不同的商業上的專業和操守，但以上這些，在中央計劃的經濟體系中，皆是沒有任何存在空間的。
由中央計劃主導的經濟體系，例如前蘇聯的體制，在創造財富和提高生活水平方面，會遇到很多的困難。在理論上–在實際執行上很多時也往往如是，其生產和分配皆是由中央政府向各個不同生產機構發出的具體指令決定的，而且往往是以國家命令的形式推行…..
Much of what we took for granted in our free market system and assumed to be human nature was not nature at all, but culture. The dismantling of the central planning function in an economy does not, as some had supposed, dramatically establish a free market entrepreneurial system, There is a vast amount of capitalist culture and infrastructure underpinning market economies that has evolved over generations: laws, conventions, behaviours, and a variety pf business professions and practices that have no important function s in a centrally planned economy.
Centrally planned economic systems, such as that which existed in the Soviet Union, had great difficulty in creating wealth and raising standards of living. In theory, and to a large extent in practice, production and distribution were determined by specific instructions – often in the form of state orders – coming from the central planning agencies to the various different producing establishments.
──格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）
根據估計，人類在地球上是存在了大概數十萬年，而迄今人類文明最接近毀滅的一天，應是1962年的古巴危機，蓋當時美蘇雙方高層都有不少聲音，認定對方已是決意開戰，因此已準備隨時先行發射核彈。核戰最終沒有爆發，是有賴好幾個幸運的偶然，這包括甘迺迪認定赫魯曉夫沒有命令殺死美國軍官，甘迺迪之弟最終找到美國蘇聯領事館內有人可確保能把訊息通傳給赫魯曉夫等等，令到雙方可以在幾乎最後一秒剎車，以及妥協出一雙方都可接受的退出方案。
The Dangers of the Cuban Crisis Helped Shift the Pendulum
However, the crisis may have also fostered a degree of mutual trust between Kennedy and Khrushchev, making both leaders realize that if tensions continued to escalate, the ultimate consequence would be the destruction of human civilization. From this perspective, Kennedy’s 1963 peace strategy speech can be seen as his first attempt to reverse the course of this dangerous trajectory—a step that yielded some results. Unfortunately, this “Great Event of the Century” was left incomplete due to Kennedy’s assassination.
Yet, despite this setback, the ripple effects of this shift in direction may have persisted. More than two decades later, Gorbachev’s efforts to extend goodwill to the West, his vision of a new world order, and his approach to the political transformations in Eastern Europe can be viewed as a continuation—or even a second wave—of Kennedy’s “Great Trick of the Century.”
The Second Wave of the “Century’s Great Shift”
In some ways, this second wave may have been an even more ambitious and transformative step than the first. At the time, the United States and the Soviet Union were recognized as the world’s leading superpowers. If they had been able to take the lead in halting the arms race and reducing their nuclear arsenals, the global threat posed by nuclear weapons could have been significantly diminished. More importantly, had the United States and the Soviet Union collaborated on shaping a new world order—one that prioritized the long-term welfare of humanity and upheld international justice—the ability of the UN Security Council to address geopolitical crises would have been greatly enhanced.
Undoubtedly, such ideas are idealistic. However, they were not entirely detached from reality. The Soviet economy was simply incapable of sustaining an increasingly expensive arms race—especially as the Reagan administration escalated it further. From the Soviet perspective, rather than continuing a costly and unsustainable confrontation, it would have been far more beneficial to foster a more peaceful global order, integrate into the international economic system, and focus on improving living standards. This approach would have also allowed both the United States and the Soviet Union to reform their respective political systems in a stable environment.
Historical records indicate that during the negotiations over Eastern Europe’s transformation, there was a tacit understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union that NATO would not expand further eastward. From this perspective, NATO’s subsequent eastward expansion became a key factor contributing to today’s conflict in Ukraine.
A Missed Economic Opportunity
Looking back, the late 1980s and early 1990s presented a unique opportunity for a breakthrough in global peace. Unlike in 1963, this time, it was the Soviet Union that took the initiative—arguably with even greater idealism and ambition than Kennedy had demonstrated. Tragically, Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963, Gorbachev stepped down in 1991, and by the 1990s, U.S. foreign policy had shifted towards a more realpolitik approach—resembling Europe’s historical strategies rather than the idealism the United States had embraced during World War I and World War II.
It is difficult not to wonder: Had Kennedy been in office during this period, would the world have had a much greater chance of seizing this historic opportunity?
In the long run, however, perhaps an even more regrettable missed opportunity lies in the economic sphere. As Greenspan’s quote at the beginning of this discussion suggests, many economists have an incomplete understanding of the fundamental nature of free markets and the conditions necessary for their full potential to be realized. The transformations in Eastern Europe provided a rare and valuable opportunity to explore these questions more deeply, testing different economic approaches through practical experimentation. Unfortunately, this opportunity was not fully seized.
I will explore this issue further in the next discussion.
